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The late nineteenth century (1850-1900) was a time of great change in American society,
Fed by the expansion ofthe Industrial Revolution, the growth in legal doctrine matched the
mechanized innovation. Tort Law, law that governs non-criminal wrongs, experienced the
most change and growth. It was in this particular aspect of the law that a peculiar paradigm
emerged. Judges and juries seemed to have clashed when applying this fairly new piece of
law. Juries, as a reflection of the society, attempted to decide trials to match what they
wanted. However, they were thwarted by judges invoking their own vision of how tort law
was to be implemented. In this thesis, Iwill explore the various clashes that occurred in
multiple cases and how these clashes helped evolve tort .Using Illinois as a representative
of the whole country at that time, I intend to show how these clashes forced changes in the
application of tort law that better emulated the ideals of the society.
1Whenever the idea of a personal injury lawsuit arises in the minds of present day
Americans, it generally brings with it thoughts of annoyance, disgust and contempt. There
exists in the modern era the prevailing notion that suing another for damages is a post
modern construct often fed by the most greedy and inept of the society. What would
surprise many is how similar the current cases parallel those from the nineteenth century
in there prevalence. Further surprising, present day persons would also think it peculiar
how the society then had thought of those cases as a beneficial check against non-criminal
harm. During the fifty year span of the latter half of the nineteenth century, personal injury
lawsuits were subject to the various interpretations of legal doctrines and to the changes in
the doctrines themselves; in contrast to the static system that currently exists. This legal
doctrine upheaval in the late nineteenth century was due mostly to the newly developed
Tort Law attempting to properly define itself. Torts are civil wrongs; wrongs that cause
some form of harm but have no criminal sanctions for them. It was not until 1850 that the
first treatise dedicated to torts was published to guide judges in their decision with these
civil cases.' The whirlwind of changes that lead to the creation and development of the tort
law was due to the interactions of the expanding economy and industrial market
throughout the country. In Illinois particularly, the use of Chicago as a central hub by rail
companies allowed for its use to properly exemplify these changes and how they affected
the people of the state. The effects oftort law during trials in Illinois show how the
confusion over the purpose of the law was skewed in its application. With the basic
I Friedman, Lawrence. A History of American Law, Third Edition. Pg.350.
2function oflaw being a method to support the public good, the clashing between judges and
juries over judgments made clear that these two groups upheld conflicting views over the
proper application of this doctrine. Due to the continuous pressure by jurors, a forced
reexamination of the doctrines under tort law allowed for their alteration to better reflect
the society that they resided in.
The earliest essence of tort law resided in the domain of contract law. Law of
contract derived itself from the basic duty to uphold promises in the exchange of goods or
services. This duty grew to be incorporated into the English common law, which colonists
brought with them to the New World. If issues arose between individuals, Courts of Equity
would settle disputes in the best interest of the public, maintaining a balance. Legal
knowledge in the early years of a fledgling United States is most attributed to the
Commentaries of English Common Law by Sir William Blackstone.s Blackstone's
Commentaries Book II had the initial use of the word contract. First, it occurred as merely
another method in which a title could be transferred between persons. Its second and more
important usage occurred in the chapter, "OfInjuries to Personal Property". Within this
chapter, Blackstone proclaimed the rights of individuals to have dominion over their own
land and therefore be able to bar neighbors' actions from infringing upon that right." From
his initial work, contract law evolved to be dominated by the idea of the title theory of
exchange and damages. In the event that a seller failed to provide the goods to a buyer, the
buyer then had the right to acquire their promised goods or bring some sanction down on
2 Hall, Kermit. The Magic Mirror. Pg 45.
3 Blackstone, William. Commentaries of English Common Law: Book II. Pgs 440-70.
3the seller. This system thrived in the eighteenth century with its minimal, limited market.
Damages were thought of as the current loss and not the future expectation of monetary
gain. As the nineteenth century begun, contract law had cemented itself as a force for
individual choices." What was wanted by the parties involved in a dispute was upheld by
courts. When tort law began developing from contract law, it unfortunately lost this aspect
from its parent doctrine.
In the early years of the nineteenth century, tort law was slowly being created from
basic elements of common law, especially that of contract. The first significant treatment
tort received in growth was from Francis Hilliard's book The Law a/Torts, Or Private
Wrongs. Bybringing a more scientific approach to legal writings, Hilliard used his treatise
to present a systematic classification to this law.s Hilliard formalized the ways in which
redress could be had when harm occurred between persons.e His work detailed how torts
were to be approached legally. Chapter 3, entitled "General Nature and Elements of a Tort",
Hilliard explains torts, outside their connection to a contract or crime, had been explained
as either based upon lacking a precedent or are an infinitely possible action. While the
presence of both ideas made the notion of torts quite unclear, the point Hilliard was trying
to make was that one became liable for a tort when they violated their original moral duty
to not injure another when exercising one's own rights." The notion of a moral duty relates
to how the common law developed out of customs. If an injury is shown, then the
4 Horwitz, Morton. The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860. Pgs 161-3.
5 Horwitz, Morton J. The Transformation of American Law: 1870-1960, pg 12.
6 Friedman. A History of American Law, pg 350.
7 Hilliard, Francis. The Law of Torts, Or Private Wrongs, pgs 81-82.
4defendant must prove that it was somehow justified. Hilliard continues by explicitly stating
the necessity of an injury and loss, one always existing with the other, in order to maintain
a tort. Furthermore, there had to exist a tangible relation between the action and the injury
as well as the malicious intent of the one committing the act," What is commonly known
about tort law and is what is sought after in court proceedings is its use of negligence in
deciding fault. Negligence is either to not do an action that a reasonable person would do or
doing an action that a reasonable person would not do. A third possibility was causing
unintentional mischief to a third party. One who has tried to take reasonable care but is a
part of an accident due to extraordinary causes is not liable for negligence. The burden of
proving the negligence of the defendant was rested solely with the plaintiff." Within this
small, basic scope oftort law, Hilliard provided a fairly simple process for others to follow.
Forgetting one's moral duties by allowing one's rights to injure another creates a tort. Then
negligence is proven by not acting reasonably or hurting a third party. The issue is that this
simple concept was twisted. There was not a problem with claiming a tort and bringing a
civil case to trial, but with negligence. More accurately, with the additions that were added
to negligence to subvert its very existence. Hilliard had written that in order to bring
forward a tort one must be absent from any negligent fault. If the plaintiff had been
negligent and contributed to their own harm, they cannot recover against the defendant if
8 Ibid. pgs 82, 90-91, 98.
9 Ibid, pgs 124-130.
5they can prove the plaintiff was negligent in their acttons.!'' It is more than reasonable to
not allow those who contributed to their own harm to receive compensation from whoever
might also be at fault. However, how this aspect was applied was contorted as the late
nineteenth century moved forward.
Early private injury cases did well to follow the scheme utilized by Hilliard and
showed some of the overzealousness of jurors in deciding cases. One such case from this
time was that of Galena and Chicago RR Company v. Albert R.Fay. Fay and two companions
boarded the plaintiffs train at Elgin and were scheduled to ride for three miles to depart at
Clinton. The order of cars was: locomotive and tender, baggage car, second class, and then
first class. The passenger car being full, the conductor told the three to ride in the baggage
car. Halfway through the trip, when the train reached the flat or strap rail the hind bucks of
the second class car and the front bucks of the first class car jumped the tracks.l! When this
occurred, Fay jumped from the second class car causing his injuries. The initial trial
revealed that Fay had been roughhousing with one of his companions in the second class
car when the accident occurred. Witness testimony further showed that other passengers
in the first and second class car were physically fine, though emotionally shaken, from the
slight derailment.V The jury found in favor of Fay, awarding him $2500. On appeal, the
opinion by Judge Scates stated that the trial court was in error when giving instructions to
the jury; reversing the previous decision and remanding the case for a new trial. Several
10 Ibid, pgs 132-135
II 16 Ill. 558; 1855 Ill. LEXIS 161, pgs 1-2.
12 Ibid, pgs3-4.
6instructions proposed by the defendant company were rejected despite them showing
Fay's culpability.P Though this case was overturned by the improper actions of the trial
judge in his instructions, an underlying notion is the juries' willingness to side with the
plaintiff against the railroad company despite evidence showing joined or plaintiff only
culpability. The same problem in this case with jury instructions also appeared in Galena &
Chicago Union Railroad Company v. Lewis H. Yarwood. Yarwood was a companion of Fay on
the train, who also jumped offwhen the wheels derailed. Judge Scates also gave this line of
reasoning to declare a new trial.t+ In this case, it can be observed that despite the jurors
misguided and biased attempts, the law produced the correct outcome while staying in line
with how the doctrine dictated. Trial testimony showed that Fay was negligible in his
actions when the accident occurred, resulting in his injures; disqualifying him from being
able to receive damages. A correlation that is simple to understand.
In The Peoria Bridge Association v. Lyman}. Loomis, the initial trial court found the
bridge association at fault for Loomis' accident. Loomis argued that the Association
negligently failed to provide for a peaceful crossing by permitting railways to build upon
adjacent land to the bridge. The train bridge was permitted due to an amendment to an
initial 1847 Act authorizing the construction of a bridge across the Illinois River. While
Loomis was crossing the bridge in his wagon, a passing train had spooked his horses;
causing them to back up, knocking offthe guardrail and eventually falling off the side.1s
13 Ibid, pgs 5, 23-4, 28.
14 15 Ill. 468; 1854 Ill. LEXIS 45, pgs 1,4-6.
1520 Ill. 235; 1858 Ill. LEXIS 98, pgs 1-3,
7Witness testimony for Loomis claimed that the guardrails were neither sturdy enough nor
sufficient resulting in his fall and injury. Defense testimony focused on the ample time
Loomis had to cross the bridge and the delay between his horses becoming frightened
before backing over the side of the bridge.l'' During appeal, Judge Breese points out the lack
of evidence presented by Loomis to prove willful negligence on the part of the Bridge
Association. Part of the proof of negligence for the plaintiff was if they were not completely
free of fault is to be only minimally culpable. Breese pointed out the testimony that stated
Loomis had had ample time to either have walked his horses across or gotten off the wagon
before it fell over the side. Judge Breese ends his opinion by stating that the jury's decision
in damages given to Loomis had to have been based on a prejudice.l" This case might seem
to have emphasized the blatant disregard some juries had for the law when presented with
the opportunity to make a corporation suffer blame for an injury. Even the appellate judge
likened this jury's decision as being based upon prejudice. But on closer examination, the
subtext makes it seem as ifthe jury's mere existence fostered resentment from the
appellate judge. Besides unabashedly calling the trial jury prejudice and implying their
idiocy, Judge Breese quickly dismisses Loomis' claim of The Association's negligence
without a second thought.l'' Thinking methodically, with a majority of personal land
transportation at the time powered by horses, a fairly easily spooked animal, one would




8thought. While still likely Loomis had contributed to his own injury, to just dismiss the
possibility of The Peoria Bridge Association being at fault prima fascia'? borders on the
ridiculous.
A similar issue with the judge's interpretation of a case can be found in The Chicago
and Rock Island Railroad Company v. James Still. OnApril 28, 1856, Still lost his two horses
and wagon when he was struck by a train where it crossed the public highway due to, by
his claim, the carelessness of the train operators.s? The witnesses Still brought with him all
make the same claim: they did not hear the whistle be blown or bell rung as it approached
the crossing nor did they see the head light lantern lit on the front of the train. The Railroad
Company had witnesses who refuted the claims made by the plaintiff's witnesses: the head
light was burning brightly and the both the whistle and bell were used approprtately.s! In
the first trial, the jury could not come to a decision based upon the evidence given by the
witness testimony. A second trial was held; using the same evidence, this second jury did
find in favor of the plaintiff and awarded Still for the damages he recetved.F With the
Railroad Company's appeal, the presiding judge, Walker, based his ruling opinion on
something that might have once resembled the doctrine on tort law. Judge Walker gives a
brief description over what occurred and emphasized the need for utmost care to try to
avoid such a collision. When he compares the opposing witnesses' testimonies, he gives
more credence to those from the Railroad Company because they were positively testifying,
19 Prima Fascia - at first glance
20 19 Ill. 499; 1858 Ill. LEXIS 15, pg 1.
21 Ibid. pgs 2-15.
22 Ibid, pgs 1, 19.
9while Still's witnesses were only negatively testifylng.P Because the Company's witnesses
happened to be stating affirmatives, that automatically gave what they said more weight
than the opposing witnesses who were stating negatives. Besides for this "reason", Walker
stated that there was clear, undisputed evidence that Still was inadequately positioned in
his wagon by having his back to where the train cars were coming from. A better sitting
position and a quick glance would have saved Still the injuries he suffered.>' This damning
evidence was spoken of only one person and was not a witness for the Railroad Company.
William Miller, the first witness to testify on behalf of Still had mentioned that Still was
sitting in the bottom ofthe wagon.s- He,Miller, is one of the same persons that Judge
Walker had previously dismissed the testimony of because it was negative in its claim.
Walker reversed the decision of the lower court because Still's witnesses' testimony was
out weighted except for the one part that showed Still not taking the utmost care in his
wagon. Aswith the prior case of The Peoria Bridge Association, it was more than likely Still
should have seen the train approaching. However, the explanation used by Judge Walker to
create negligence in Still's inaction appeared convoluted and forced.
Now it might seem as if the harsh scrutiny ofthe appellate judges' decisions were
unfairly portrayed, but so was the treatment given to jurors at the time. The notion of
contributory negligence, that the plaintiff also being at fault for their injury, was not just a
method to prevent abuses of tort law by individuals. From how it was used, its function
23 Ibid, pgs 21-22.
24 Ibid, pgs 22-23.
25 Ibid, pgs 2-3.
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would suggest that it was meant to keep the ideologies of the jury and by extension, society,
in check.o' With the use of contributory negligence, judges had their way to achieve the
verdicts that they believed would be the best outcome in the eventual appeals.
Unsurprisingly, it generally appeared to be for the benefit of corporations. It was not
however just for the desire of keeping a revenue generator in state. There was real concern
on behalf of some judges as to how much should a company pay for its damages and to how
many, even minimally affected.s? In The Chicago and Rock Island Railroad Company v. James
McKean, it followed an eerily similar pattern to the Still Case in how the accident occurred
and the trial witnesses for both sides. Farmer McKean was hit by the train while crossing
the tracks with his two-horse drawn wagon. The appeal of the case had Judge Breese
reverse the decision of the lower court that was in favor of McKean. Breese based his ruling
on the fact that McKean had suffered relatively minor personal damage with only a
displacement of an ankle bone and that the jury's decision was likely due to prejudice
against the railroad company.s" What was interesting was the concurring opinion by Judges
Walker and Lawrence. They felt that the judgment should have been reversed due to the
excessiveness of the money rewarded. Their opinion even explicitly states that if the
awarded compensation ($5875) was less, the case would not have been picked for
26 Malone, Wex S. "The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence" in Essays in
Nineteenth-Century American Legal History edited by Wythe Holt, pg 282.
27 Friedman, pgs 351-352.
2840 Ill. 218; 1866 Ill. LEXIS 178,37-38.
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review.s? The striking positions of the judges in this case showed the flaw in having
conflicting ideas justify the same ends.
Contributory negligence was not the only way in which judges kept tort claims out
of the hands of juries; another doctrine used was that of the fellow servant rule. This
dictated that an employee could not sue their employer for damages caused to them by
another employee. Only if the employer was proven personally negligent, could the
employee then sue.30 This rule is best exemplified by the case Francis Honner v. The Illinois
Central Railroad Company. Honner, an employee of the company, attempted to sue for
damages when he became injured when another employee improperly used the turntable
causing the attached iron bar to be broken off and flung at Honner.t- The trial court ended
with a judgment of a demurrer, a decision that accepts the facts but denies the sufficiency
ofthem to support the allegation. Judge Caton in the appeal stated that the demurrer was
correctly used. At no point had Honner provided evidence that it was his employers that
were neglectful in their duties. Caton even alluded to the dangers that inherently existed
with his job.32 This relates to yet a third doctrine used to subvert the use of negligence.
Assumption of risk meant that if an employee works at a position in which their lives are
generally threatened, they cannot sue for damages if an injury occurred as they took it
29 Ibid, 46.
30 Friedman, pg 354.
31 15 Ill. 550; 1854 Ill. LEXIS 60, pgs 1-2.
32 Ibid, pg 5.
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upon themselves to work at the dangerous position.P The sinister use of this doctrine often
neglected the reality that employer and employee were not on equal footing when deciding
what work should be completed. It was ill-advised to believe that an employee would
willingly put themselves in extraordinarily dangerous position.t+
Within this entire seemingly downward spiral of tort law having minimal impact
benefiting persons, there are several cases in which the stricter doctrines of negligence
were seemingly set aside. In Owen Tuller et al. v. Rosannah Talbot, Talbot was a passenger
in Tuller's stage coach that over turned due to negligence ofthe driver, causing her injuries.
The accident occurred when Ward, another passenger, was asked to drive when the
original driver became ill. It was Ward's lack of knowledge for the road that resulted in the
stage coach overturning in a ditch. The initial case had the jury ruling in favor of Talbot and
awarding her $1050.35 Justice Walker in his opinion on the appeal stated that neither the
court nor jury erred in their processes. Even though Ward was initially a passenger, when
he took up the position as the driver of the stage coach, his actions as such became the
responsibility of Tuller. Furthermore, the trial court's instruction on the duty of common
carriers of people was properly given as it only informed of the responsibility.w This
occasional leniency on individuals is most noticeable in lawsuits against cities. In the case
of The City of Joliet v. Amelia H. Verley, Joliet had built a small set of stairs to connect a city's
33 Gold, David M. The Shaping of Nineteenth-Century Law: John Appleton and
Responsible Individualism, pg 88.
34 Ibid, pg 89.
35 23 Ill. 298; 1860 Ill. LEXIS 213, pgs 1-2, 7.
36 Ibid, pgs 7-11.
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sidewalk to a canal bridge that had been constructed by an outside company. Verley was
injured when her dress became snagged on a loose nail on the walkway. During her
attempt to turn around to unsnag her dress, she toppled over some loose, warped planks
on the stairs. The jury had ruled in favor of Verley, awarding her $1500.37 The ensuing
appeal towards the ruling brought by Joliet, lead to Judge Beckwith's opinion that resulted
in jury's decision being proven correct. Beckwith first stated that Joliet had had no
obligation to connect its city sidewalk to the bridge walkway as it was built by another
company outside its control. However, by building a connection, the city had then become
obligated to maintain that connecting path. Even though the catalyst for the injury was a
protruding nail on the bridges pathway, the loose boards and lack of handrails on the
connecting path caused Verley to fall and injure herself. Had the boards been in proper
shape, she could have easily loosened her dress from the nail without incident. There being
no fault as to how the case was submitted to the jury, Beckwith affirmed its decision.i" Both
of these cases displayed judgments based on the merits of the evidence along with
following the basic ideals oftort law. The decision in the Talbot Case could have easily been
reversed by Judge Walker ifhe had focused on the fact that Ward was still not an employee
of Tuller despite taking up the driver's mantle.
Barbara Stumps v. Susanna Kelley shows another example ofthe weight ofthe
evidence dictating the outcome. Kelley, on behalf of a minor that was injured, sued Stumps
3735 Ill. 58; 1864 Ill. LEXIS 170, pgs 1-2,5.
38 Ibid, pgs 6-12.
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when her cow hooked the minor. The jury found for Kelley in the initial case and granted a
judgment of $500.39 In the appeal, Stumps argued that the jury erred in its decision due to
its contradicting evidence presented at trial. Judge Walker in his opinion did say there was
some leeway as to which way the evidence weighed more heavily, but the ruling reached
was consistent with the evidence that had been brought forth.s? One could think that the
injury of a child had brought out the more lenient ruling from the judge, but that notion is
easily disproven by the case The Galena and Chicago Union Railroad Company v. Frederick
Jacobs. A four and a half year old minor was struck by a train on the Railroad Company's
property; the result of the original trial was a verdict in favor of'[acobs and receiving $2000
out of the sought after $15,000.41 In the appeal, Judge Breese reversed the decision of the
lower court for several reasons. First, Jacobs had failed to provide any evidence to suggest
that the Railroad Company knew that a minor was on their property or had the consent to
be there.s- Secondly, the evidence Jacobs had provided asserting the consent of workers'
families to be on the Railroad property was ill conceived as the minor is not related to any
workers.v As for negligence, Breese stated that the levels that accrued in both parties
should be compared in order to come to the correct decision.v' Though Breese took a soft
approach in denying the collection of damages for the minor, an act not normally seen, it
was still denied all the same. There was a fairly simple pattern that seemed to have
39 22 Ill. 140; 1859 Ill. LEXIS 34, pgs 1.
40 Ibid, pgs 4-5.
41 20Ill. 478; 1858 Ill. LEXIS 159, pg 1.
42 Ibid, pgs 16-18.
43 Ibid, pgs 20-22.
44 Ibid, pgs 42-43.
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emerged in these early tort law cases; whenever it was an individual v. a large corporation,
the individual losing their case appeared as a foregone conclusion. Cases involving small
companies, cities or were between persons appeared to use a less strict version of tort law;
one that was more in tuned with how the juries perceived it should work. Being beyond
approach was essentially the only method to win against a large corporation as how the
use of tort law stood in the early decades of its use.
The status quo of the application of tort law by the courts continued well into the
1870's. In The City of Peru v. Laura A. French, Peru attempted to appeal the trial court's
decision awarding damages to the plaintiff. French was crossing Bluff Street where it
intersected with Rock Street when she had stepped into a hole, breaking her leg and
permanently crippling herself.v' The jury trial had decided that the city was negligent in
their duties to maintain the wooden plank crossing and that French was completely
without fault, awarding her $2000. Peru vehemently decried the decision and based their
appeal on an invalid verdict contrary to the evidence, an excessive monetary award and the
lower court refusing to allow evidence beneficial to the city.46Judge Scott delivered his
decision of the appeal by affirming the actions of the lower court. Scott first discounted the
evidence Peru had wanted but was excluded. Peru had produced a paper that claimed
French had withdrawn her offer to accept a $100 settlement from Peru. However this
evidence lacked the subsequent proofthat this letter had been written by French or her
4555 Ill. 317; 1870 Ill. LEXIS 360, pgs 1-2.
46 Ibid, pg 2.
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attorney and was a mere proposition, not an agreement French had to uphold.f? Judge Scott
continued his opinion by discounting the city's opinion that the jury lacked the evidence to
side for French. There was more than enough evidence citing the disrepair of the sidewalk,
its woeful condition and that the city knew of the problems the sidewalk had.48 Scott
completes his opinion by stating that the amount of damages awarded to French was not
excessive, as at the time of the incident, she had been abandoned by her former husband
and was supporting herself, which she could not due to her injuries.t? This case's
similarities to Joliet v. Verley show how little has changed in the portrayals of particular
groups in these cases. The Chicago, Burlington and Quincy RR Co v. Albert Griffin is another
example of the stagnant use of tort law. With the appeal also decided by Judge Scott, he
reversed the trial decision that had awarded Griffin $1500 in damages.w Griffin had
intended to ride the train from Mendota to Earl, however a mistake had occurred and he
was given a ticket to Meriden, a midway destination, instead. When the conductor wanted
Griffin to pay the twenty cents for the ride from Meriden to Earl, he initially refused and
was out off the train. Griffin quickly changed his mind and went to the conductor to pay the
fare but became irate and used inappropriate language in the presence of other passengers.
The conductor having the authority to enforce decorum on the train had Griffin kicked off
the train.v' Scott stated that the jury was misinformed before deliberating. Griffin's use of
47 Ibid, pgs 4-5.
48 Ibid, pg 6.
49 Ibid, pgs 7-9.
50 68 Ill. 499; 1873 Ill. LEXIS 272, pg 1.
51 Ibid, pgs 2-3.
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obscene language allowed the conductor the right and duty to remove him from the train;
as he was no longer a passenger the first time he was put off the train, there was no broken
arrangement between him and the train company.P
Some changes did start to occur in the mid 1870's that showed very small but
noticeable shift in the way appellate judges viewed tort law and its application in the lower
courts. In The Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Joseph Hammer, Judge Walker not
surprisingly reversed the decision of the lower court that had decided in favor of
Hamrner.P Where the accident occurred in Champaign was known as the depot grounds,
an area considered quasi public as the rail company shares the rights to the land with the
public. Due to this joined land, Hammer could not be considered trespassing when the
accident occurred.s+ Judge Walker stated that both sides were negligent: Hammer for not
taking better care when crossing the depot and the company for not having a greater duty
for safety. The lower court instruction to the jury said that they could vote in favor of
Hammer if they thought his negligence was slight in comparison to the railroad company's
negligence. 55 Judge Walker gives the correct interpretation ofthe law as the plaintiff having
slight negligence and the defendant having gross negligence. With the instructions that
were originally given, Walker believed that would allow plaintiffs who were guilty of gross
negligence receive damages because the defendant was even more so negligent. 56 While
what occurred in this case does not seem like it had any major importance, a second look
52 Ibid, pgs 5-8.
5372 Ill. 347; 1874 Ill. LEXIS 180, pg 1.
54 Ibid, pgs 1-3.
55 Ibid, pgs 5, 8.
56 Ibid, pgs 8-10.
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allowed one to see what the deciding judge had explicitly stated. That it was possible for a
plaintiff in their personal injury lawsuit to have had some negligence in their own harm,
but could still receive compensation for their damages if the defendant was grossly
negligent. This was a momentous step forward in the application of tort law; when one no
longer had to be a pristine immaculate of any negligent actions to be allowed some
compensation. In The Chicago and Northwestern Railway Cov. William Coss, this new rule of
plaintiff slight negligence/defendant gross negligence also arises. Also decided by Judge
Walker on appeal, he did reverse this decision in favor ofthe appealing railroad company.
Coss was injured while attempting to cross freight trains in order to reach the soon to
depart passenger train.57 Walker's opinion stated that while the railroad was negligent in
not providing safe and adequate passage for its passengers to reach the train, Coss put his
life in too great a hazard to warrant any compensation for the damages he received.w
These two cases displayed a great change undertaking the courts as tort law was
concerned. For there to have been a concession from upper courts to allow the possibility
of some plaintiff negligence to not instantly disqualify them from receiving money for their
injuries, shows the effect the juries were having on the thoughts of appellate judges.
Even with this slight shift, juries still occasionally displayed an unnecessary zeal to
benefit those who were hurt in connection to a corporation. The City of Monmouth v. Julia
Sullivan had a jury that believed the duties of a city to care for its sidewalks extended
farther than it actually did. Temporarily leaving a church festival at 2:00am lito attend the
5773 Ill. 394; 1874 Ill. LEXIS 363, pgs 1-2.
58 Ibid, pgs 3-4.
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call of nature", Sullivan walked fifty feet away, stepped off the side of the sidewalk to use
the vacant lot and fell six feet down.>? Judge Pillsbury, in favor of Monmouth, reversed the
lower court's decision. He cited that Monmouth had kept the thirteen foot wide sidewalk in
good repair and the area Sullivan had stepped down to reach had never been connected to
the sidewalk. Sullivan as a visiting person for the festival, failed to ask the companion she
was going to attend nature with for the nearest outhouse or if she were stepping down in a
safe place.w It would be impractical for Monmouth to provide unnecessary railings on such
a wide path when it is clear that there was a drop. Furthermore, Sullivan had of her own
volition walked off the sidewalk.s- The overzealous approach of the jury had to be checked
by the appellate judge in this case, but this did not negate the continued importance in
affecting tort law.
More changes occurred during the early 1880's that furthered signified the shifting
tort law. In The Chicago City Railway Company v. Benjamin Mumford, the trial court judge
issued a remittitur= only awarding Mumford $5000 of $8000 for his injuries and
overruling a new tria1.63 Mumford, while attempting to exit a street car in Chicago near
Palmer House, was flung to the ground when the street car jerked forward suddenly.
Witnesses on the street car gave consistent testimony of what happened to Mumford. The
driver of the car notified the stop, when the car slowed, Mumford tried to exit, but was
598 Ill. App. 50; 1880 Ill. App. LEXIS 295, pgs 2-3.
60 Ibid, pgs 3, 5.
61 Ibid, pgs 8-10
62 The reduction of an excessive monetary verdict.
63 97 Ill. 560; 1881 Ill. LEXIS 36, pg 1.
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thrown to the ground due to a sudden jerk by the car.64Judge Craig upheld the lower
court's decision, citing the evidence showing that the driver had initiated the stop but failed
to properly complete said stop. Craig also stated that the lower court judge use of a
remittitur negated the appealing railways claim that the damages were too excessive.sf A
similar action of reducing the awarded money occurred in The Union Rolling Mill Company
v. Thomas Gillen. The Union Rolling MillCompany manufactured iron and steel in Chicago.
They possessed their own train engines to make deliveries throughout the city by use ofthe
Chicago/Alton rail tracks.66 After a delivery, the Mill Company cars backed into the wagon
of Gillen, destroying the wagon and causing him severe injury. In the appellate decision,
Judge Sheldon had affirmed the decision of the lower court. What the Mill Company was
arguing the most during its appeal was the use of a remittitur after the original judgment
had an excessive amount of $5000. Sheldon was clear that, the use of remittitur was well
established and without evidence to prove their other arguments that Gillen had displayed
negligence in his own actions or was already inflicted with lameness, the Mill Company lost
their appeal.s" By adding the capability to lower awarded compensation from an excessive
level allowed for individuals who were deserving of receiving damages from having to
forfeit them due to a jury trying to award them too much.
The concept of individuals having "nobody to blame", a joke at the expense of
contributory negligence, in personal injury lawsuits began to wane as the century was
64 Ibid, pgs 2-6.
65 Ibid, pgs 10-12.
66 100 Ill. 52; 1881 Ill. LEXIS 68, pg 1.
67 Ibid, pgs 5-8.
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drawing to an end.68 An increase in the number of cases reflected the greater ease in which
one could bring a case to trial. Furthermore, those that were brought forward had less to
worry about overly expanded details falsely dictating decisions. In North Chicago St. R. Co.
v. Margaret Fitzgibbons, Judge Sears upheld the lower court's judgment in favor of
Fitzgibbons who was injured when attempting to exit a train when it started moving again.
He dismissed the first claims of the rail company regarding the juries choosing which
witnesses to believe. Sears stated that despite Fitzgibbons only having four witnesses to
her opponents nine, the actual testimony of the witnesses leading to differently weighed
evidence did not automatically disqualify the jury's decision.s? This idea is in contrast to
the completely opposite belief of Judge Walker in the Still Case.t» The damages being asked
for, $10,000, were not excessive due to the extensive nature of Fitzgibbons injuries."!
Although not mentioned, the facts of this case veered closely to a late nineteenth century
doctrines' development in tort law designed to ease the burden of proving negligence. The
doctrine oflast clear chance generally shifted fault on to the defendant ifthere was ample
opportunity for them to still avoid causing harrn.v As it was the train in this case that
caused the injuries to Fitzgibbons by not waiting fully for her, as a passenger, to depart.
The other new doctrine that emerged was res ipsa /oquitor, the thing speaks for itself. In
The Town of Grafton v. Elizabeth Mooney, the town's negligence in the injuries of Mooney
68 Friedman, pgs 357.
69 79 Ill. App. 632; 1898 III .App. 342, pgs 3-4.
7019 Ill. 499; 1858 Ill. LEXIS 15, pgs 21-22.
71 79 Ill. App. 632; 1898 III .App. 342, pgs 4-5.
72 Friedman, pgs. 359.
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was upheld by the appellate judge. Mooney had been injured when another pedestrian
stepped on a loose plank, causing the end to come up and hit her ankle.?" Grafton tried to
push blame onto Mooney for not watching out for the obviously loose planks, but Judge
Thompson dismissed their claim. Since it was clear that the sidewalk had been in disrepair
for some time, Grafton had failed to exercise reasonable diligence in the upkeep of its
sidewalk being negligible for the harm it caused.>' Although the changes in tort law were
not the spark of a huge alteration, the lessening usage of contributory negligence to deny
tort claims slowly increased in consistency. In Mabel Cook v. A.S. Piper & Co.,Cookwas
injured when a cake of ice fell off of a wagon after she cut across the street to get to the ice
wagon. It was the appeal that reversed the ruling and declared Cook in favor to receive
compensation. Judge Horton chided the actions of the trial judge for removing the jury's
ability to decide on the negligence culpability ofthe wagon owner.i"
The seemingly simple premise of tort law was anything but from its inception
through the beginnings of the twentieth century. Illinois showed some prime examples of
how jury decisions and judge decisions clashed throughout the country as both groups
attempted to perform their task for bettering the society as a whole. Tort law started as
vague notions embedded within common and contract law. After Blackstone touched upon
the subject, Hilliard was able to scientifically structure tort law into a set of systematic
rules. Unfortunately, they were viewed as guidelines; open to the interpretation of many,
7389 Ill. App. 622; 1899 Ill. App. LEXIS 695 pgs 1-3.
74 Ibid, pgs 4-6.
7579 Ill. App. 291; 1898 Ill. App. LEXIS 270, pgs 2, 4.
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causing a perverse application and perception from both judges and jurors. As the years
progressed, the marked contrast between the dichotomic groups shrank more and more as
juries began having a small, but steady impact on the ideals of appellate judges. Those
minute gains allowed for judges to enforce the law that more accurately reflected what
society wanted. For the last decade of the nineteenth century, contributory negligence was
no longer being forced into all aspects oftort law. One aspect that the legal scholar Ira
Moore wrote about in his treatise of the Illinois civil law was of the changes that occurred
to tort law during the latter half of the nineteenth century." Cases in the early twentieth
century were being decided on an expanded mode of Hilliard's basic principles while still
reflecting the fifty years of development that they experienced. Despite the seemingly long
span of time, the change in tort law illustrated the importance of the impact society has on
its laws.
76 Moore, Ira M. A treatise on ... torts ... in the state of Illinois. pgs 263-6.
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